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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
JOHN D. GLYNN, 
Plaintiff ~and A'ppellant, 
vs. 
MARJORIE DOCTORMAN 
DUBIN, aka MARJORIE C 
DOCTORMAN and DESERET ase No. 9388 
FEDERAL SAVINGS AND 
LOAN AS'SOCIATI10N, a 
corporation, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
APPELLANT'S PETITION FOR 
REHEARING AND SUPPORTING BRIEF 
JOHN D. GLYNN, Plaintiff 'and Appellant in 
the above entitled matter, appearing in propria per-
sona, pursuant to Rule '76(e) Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, respectfully petitions this Honorable 
Court for a rehearing in the above entitled cause 
upon the following grounds: 
1. The decision of the Supreme Court is er-
roneous in that the necessary effect of such decision 
is to deprive plaintiff-appellant of his property 
without due process of law contrary to the 14th 
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. 
2. In addition to a denial of due process of 
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law, the force and effect of the decision of the 
Supreme Court is to render void or abrogate Sec-
tion 30-4-4 of Utah Code Annotated, 19'53. 
3. The force and effect of the decision of the 
Supreme Court is to render void Sec. 25-1-8 of Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953, and to void 'any contract or 
conveyance effecting property mentioned in the peti-
tion made by either party to an action for divorce 
or separate maintenance irrespective of whether 
or not such contract or conveyance is bona fide, for 
consideration and not subject to attack under the 
Fraudulent ·Conveyance Act, 25-1-8, Utah Code An-
notated, 1953. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff-Appellant requests 
that a relhearing be granted, that the Court re-ex-
amine the facts and the l'aw and that the judgment 
of the trial court be reversed with judgment in 
favor of plaintiff-appellant for partition of real 
property and for an accounting of rental income. 
Since defendant-respondent stated that she was satis-
fied with the evidence on her counter-claim (T.R~ 
p. 35) no useful purpose would be served by a re-
trial and the judgment should be reversed forthwith. 
JOHN D. GLYNN 
In Propria Persona 
9171 Wilshire Boulevard 
Beverly Hills, California 
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CERTIFICATE OF 
PLAINTIFF -APPELLANT APPEARING 
IN PROPRIA PERSONA 
I hereby certify that I am appearing in propria 
persona herein and that in my opinion there is good 
cause to believe the judgment objected to is erroneous 
and th·at the case ought to be re-examined as prayed 
in the Petition, and that this Petition is not filed 
for the purpose of delay or to otherwise hinder the 
prosecution of this action. 
JOHN D. GLYNN 
In Propria Persona 
9171 Wilshire Boulevard 
Beverly Hills, California 
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BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
POINT I 
THE DECISION OF THE SUPREME COURT IS 
ERRONEOUS IN THAT THE NECESSARY EFFECT 
OF SUCH DECISION IS TO DEPRIVE ·P·LAINTIFF-
APPELLANT OF HIS PROPERTY WITHOUT DUE 
PROCESS OF LAW CONTRARY TO THE 14T·H AMEND-
MENT TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED 
STATES. 
·The opinion of the Supreme Court fails to dis-
cuss or ·answer any of the 'Points on Appeal set forth 
in Plaintiff-Appellant's Brief and the opinion fails 
to cite ~any case or statutory authority in support 
of its reaJsoning or decision. The opinion of the Su-
preme Court does not rest on the findings or con-
clusions of the trial court but instead rests on its 
own conclusions without regard to the findings of 
the trial court or the deficiencies of the findings or 
conclusion·s made by the trial court. 
The force and effect of the decision of the Su-
preme Court is to deprive Plaintiff-Appellant of his 
property without due process of law contrary to the 
14th Amendment to the Constitution of the United 
States. This denial of due process first flows from 
and arises out of the decision of the Supreme Court. 
It is not disputed that on December 7, 1959-, 
Dr. Martin F. Dubin executed in favor of Plaintiff-
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Appellant a quitclaim deed of his interest in the 
property which is the subject matter of the instant 
action, and that said deed was recorded on S'aid 
date. It is also not disputed that on said date Pl'ain-
tiff-Appellant in consideration of the execution of 
said deed paid Dr. Dubin the sum of $100.00, ex-
ecuted a promissory note in Dr. Dubin's favor for 
$5,000.00, and cancelled legal fees owing to Plain-
tiff-Appellant in the amount of $3,000.00. It is also 
not disputed th·at a like quitclaim deed was executed 
by Dr. Dubin in favor of Plaintiff-Appellant on 
December 8, 1959. Further, there is no dispute that 
the action pending on December 7, 1959, between 
Dr. Dubin and his wife was dismissed on December 
8, 1959. Importantly, there is no di1spute that Plain-
tiff-Appellant was not named as a party to either 
the suit pending on December 7, 1959, or to the suit 
filed on December ~8, 1959. Plaintiff-Appellant was 
not served with process either personally or constru-
tively as to either suit, nor was Dr. Dubin restrained 
by court order from disposing of or encumbering the 
property held in joint tenancy as is provided in an 
action for separate m·aintenance by Section 30-4-4, 
Utah Code Annotated 1H53. Plaintiff-Appellant was 
not advised by any means that his rights under either 
the deed of December 7, 1959, or December 8, 1959 
would be determined at the hearing or trial of the 
action filed on December 8, 1959. 
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Defendant- Respondent Marjorie Doctorm'an 
Dubin admitted in her pleadings to the instant ac-
tion by Plaintiff-Appellant that he stated a cause 
of action for partition of real property. Apparently, 
the position of Defendant-Respondent was th'at t'he 
deeds were void under the Utah Fraudulent Con-
veyance Act, Utah Code Annotated Section 25-1-8. 
However, the decision of the Supreme ·Court does 
not discuss the serious deficiencies in the findings 
of the trial court on this theory, but rather the de-
cision holds that since Plaintiff-Appellant knew of 
the action for separate maintenance (improperly 
amended to 'an action for divorce) that under no 
circumstances could Dr. Dubin convey any interest 
in the property not subject to divestment, irrespec-
tive of whether or not such conveyance was made 
in good faith and not fraudulently under Section 
25-1-8 of Utah Code Annotated, 1953. 
The main point of the instant petition for re-
hearing is that Plaintiff-Appellant has been denied 
due process of l·aw. The Supreme Court of the United 
States ·has decided many cases in which the question 
was whether or not the type of notice given to a 
party to ~an action was sufficient to constitute due 
process of law. In the instant case Plaintiff-Appel-
lant w.as not .a party to either of s·aid actions and 
w.as not given any notice that his rights under his 
deed were to be determined by either of said actions. 
6 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
At the trial of the action filed December 8, 1959, 
no mention was made to the court by Defendant-
Respondent of the fact that the instant Plaintiff-
Appell'ant had been conveyed Dr. Dubin's interest 
even though she and her two counsel personally 
knew of said fact. This is borne out by the tran-
script of record of said trial which is an exhibit to 
the instant action. The United States Supreme Court 
has stated in Mtttllane v. Centr.al Hanover B~ank & 
Trust Co., 339 U. S. 306, 314, 315, 94 L.Ed. 865, 
873, 87 4, 70 S. Ct. 652; Covey v. Somers, 351 U. S. 
141, 146, 100 L.Ed. 1021, 76 S. Ct. 724: 
"An elemental land fundamental require-
ment of due process in any proceeding which 
is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably 
calculated, under all the circumstances, to ap-
prise interested parties of the pendency of 
the action and afford them an opportunity 
to present their objections . . . when notice 
is a person's due, process which is a mere 
gesture is not due process. The me'ans em-
ployed must be such as one desirous of actu-
ally informing the absentee might reasonably 
adopt to ·accomplish it. 
"The fundamental requisite of due pro-
cess of law is the opportunity to be heard. 
Grannis v. Orde,an, 234 U. S. 385, 394, 58 
L.Ed. 1363, 1368, 34 S. Ct. 779. This right to 
be heard has little re~ality or worth unless one 
is informed that the matter is pending and 
can choose for himself whether to appear or 
default, acqtttiesce or contest." (Emphasis 
supplied) 
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In Grannis v. Ordean, ·34 S. Ct. 779, 234 U. S. 
38'5, 58 L.Ed. 1363, the United States Supreme 
Court stated: 
"If in the action the court has jurisdic-
tion over the res the judgment in order to be 
binding with respect to the interest of a non-
resident who is not served with process within 
the state, must be ·based upon constructive 
notice given by publication, mailing, or other-
wise, substantially in the manner prescribed 
by the law of the state." 
In Griffen v. Griffen, 66 S. Ct. 5'56, 32'7, U. S. 
220, 90 L.Ed. 635 it was held that: 
"Due process forbids any exercise of 
judicial power substantially affecting a de-
fendant's rights without notice." 
The court also stated that "Notice by personal 
or substituted service cannot, consistently with due 
p·rocess, be dispensed with, even in the case of judg-
ment in rem with respect to property within the 
jurisdiction of the court rendering the judgment." 
In Hansberry v. Lee, 61 S. Ct. 115, 311 U. S. 
32, 85 L.Ed. 22, 132 ALR 7 41 it was specifically 
held that the enforcement of a judgment against the 
person or property of one not designated as a party 
nor made a party by service of process violates the 
due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments. In State of Missuori ex rei Hurwitz v. 
North, 46 S. Ct. 384, 271 U. S. 40, 70 L.Ed. 818 
it was held that notice of suit and opportunity for 
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hearing are requisites of due process. See also: 
Lambert v. People of the State of California, 78 S. 
Ct. 240, 355 U. S. 225; Shelly v. Kraemer, 68 S. Ct. 
836, 334 U. S. 1, 92 L.Ed. 1161, 3 ALR 2d 441. 
In the instant case the judgment of the Utah 
Supreme Court could not have been given without 
depriving Plaintiff-Appellant of due process of l~aw. 
The basi's of the Court's opinion was to hold that 
the judgment rendered by the trial court in the ac-
tion filed on December 8, 1959 determined the in-
stant Plaintiff-Appellant's rights even though the 
instant Plaintiff-Appellant w~as not named ~as a 
party in said suit, was not served personally or con--
structively with service of process and the deed under 
'\Vhich the instant Plaintiff-Appellant claims his 
rights was not mentioned in the pleadings nor at 
the time of trial even though the existence of such 
deed was known at the time of filing of the action 
and tri'al thereof by the instant Defendant-Respon-
dent and her two counsel. Under Utah law, the in-
stant Defendant- Respondent could have made the 
instant Plaintiff-Appellant a party to her action 
filed on December 8, 19"59, but she did not choose to 
do so and to permit her now to use the decision in 
that action to deprive Plaintiff-Appell'ant of his pro-
perty is a flagrant violation of due process of law. 
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POINT II 
IN ADDITION TO A DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS 
OF LAW, THE FORCE AND EFFECT 'OF THE DE-
CISION OF THE SUPREME COURT IS TO RENDER 
VOID OR ABROGATE SECTION 30-4-4 OF UTAH 
CODE ANNOTATED, 1953. 
The opinion of the Supreme Court states that 
the original action for separate maintenance placed 
the property within the jurisdiction of the court and 
th'at ''Dr. Dubin could not make any conveyance 
thereof except subject to adjudication by the court." 
This is contrary to Section 30-4-4 of Utah Code An-
notated, 1953, the Utah cases of Adamson v. Adam-
son, 55 Utah 544, 188 Pac. 6'3'5 and Nielson v. Nie~ 
son, 30 Utah 3'91, 85 Pac. 429, and cases and authori-
ties from other jurisdictions cited in Appellant's 
Brief at pages 23, 24, 25 and 27 through 3'4. 
Section 30-4-4, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 
specifically provides that in an action for separate 
maintenance the plaintiff in such action may pro-
cure from the court an order enjoining and restrain-
ing the defendant from disposing of or encumber-
ing real property involved in such action and that 
when the order is filed with the county recorder 
where the property is located "from the time of fil-
ing such order the property described shall be charg-
ed with a lien in favor of plaintiff to the extent of 
any judgment which may be rendered in the action". 
It is obvious that the Utah legisl'ature has de-
to 
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termined that until such time that a court order 
is obtained and filed with the county recorder that 
there cannot be a lien created as to the property 
in question. In the instant case no such order was 
obtained. A lis pendens does not take the place of 
such order. The effect of the Supreme Court's 
opinion is to render void or ~abrogate the legislative 
enactment and to create a lien merely upon the 
filing of a petition for separate mainten,ance. This 
the Court cannot do since there is no ambiguity or 
defect in the code section which can possibly sup-
port the statutory construction inherent in the 
Court's opinion. In fact, the force and effect of the 
Court's opinion is to render useless or as an idle 
act the filing of 'a lis pendens since the Court states 
that any conveyance may be held to be invalid irre-
spective of whether or not such conveyance was bona 
fide and not in violation of the Fraudulent Convey-
nace Act, Section 25-1-8, Utah Code Annotated, 
1953. 
It is important to note that the deed executed 
by Dr. Dubin on December 7, '1959, in favor of 
Pl'aintiff-Appellant was delivered and recorded on 
said date and prior to the action filed on December 
8, 1959, or the lis pendens filed on said date. The 
Court's opinion fails to state how Plaintiff-Appel-
lant's rights under the deed of December 7, 1959, 
could be effected by a later filed action against Dr. 
11 
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Dubin who at the time of the filing of said action 
h'ad previously conveyed his interest in the property 
to Plaintiff-Appellant. 
POINT III 
THE FORCE AND EFFE'CT OF THE DECISION 
OF THE su~PREIME co·uRT Is TO RENDER voiD 
SECTION 25-1-8 OF UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953, 
AND TO RENDER VOID ANY CONTRACT OR CON-
VEYAN·CE AFFECTING PROPERTY MENTl'ONE'D IN 
THE PETITION MADE BY EITHER PARTY TO AN 
ACTION FOR DIVORCE OR SEPARATE MAINTEN-
ANCE IRRES'PECTIVE OF W·HETHER OR NOT SUCII 
CONTRACT OR CONVEYANCE IS BONA FIDE, F·OR 
CONSIDERATION AND N·OT SUBJECT TO ATTACK 
UNDER THE FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE ACT, 
SECTION 25-1-8, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953. 
The decision in the instant case rendered by 
the Supreme Court is contrary to and overrules 
Adamson v. Adamson, Utah, 55 Utah 544, 188 Pac. 
635 and Nielson v. Nielson, 30 Utah 391, 85 Pac. 
429. Said decision is also contrary to cases -and 
authorities cited in Appellant's Brief pages 27 
through 34. Importantly, it is to be noted that no-
where in the Court's oinion is there any indication 
that the conveyances made by Dr. Dubin to Plaintiff-
Appellant were fraudulent within the requirements 
of Section 25-1-8, Utah Code Annotated, 1953. Ap-
p·arently, the Court did not care to discuss this point 
since to do so would have necessitated an examina-
tion of the serious defects in the findings to enable 
said code section to be applicable. Rather, the Court 
12 
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completely ignored the pleadings in the action and 
determined that because Pl'aintiff-Appellant knew 
of the two actions he could not receive ·any convey-
ance which would not be subject to divestment by 
adjudication by the Court. As Plaintiff-Appellant 
has heretofore stated in this brief said conclusion 
is contrary to the explicit terms of Section 30-4-4, 
Utah Code Annotated, 19'53. The force and effect 
of the Court's decision is either to create by "judicial 
legisl'ation" an unwarranted expansion of the scope 
of the Utah Fraudulent Conveyance Act or to nullify 
said code section. The court by its decision h·as dis-
abled civilly either party to a divorce or separate 
maintenan·ce action from making ·any contract or 
conveyance affecting property described in the peti-
tion to 'anyone aware of the action even though such 
contract or conveyance be bona fide, made in the 
utmost good faith and not in any respects fraudu-
lent. This not the law in any other state. It has not 
been the law in Utah. In Adamson v. Adamson, Utah, 
55 Utah 544, 188 Pac. 635, a divorce action, the 
grantee (father of the husband) knew of the action 
and purchased one half of the property from his 
son. The court upheld the conveyance. In Nielson 
v. Nielson, 30 Utah 391, 85 Pac. 429, it was held 
that the husband in a divorce action had a right to 
sell his interest in the property subject only to his 
'vife's one third interest in case she continued to 
13 
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be his wife and survived him. See also Sun Insur-
ance Co. v. White, 123 C. 196, 55 P. 902, where a 
conveyance was upheld in an action in which a lis 
pendens was filed and in which the plaintiff grantee 
had actual notice of the divorce action. The court 
in the instant case has failed to discuss or dis-
tinguish the series of cases cited in Appellant's 
Brief, pages 28 through 34, in which conveyances 
made to the husband's attorney in a divorce action 
were held to be as valid as any other conveyance 
made for valuable consideration and without intent 
to hinder, delay or defraud creditors or other per-
sons. The Court has, in effect, rendered void the 
Fraudulent Conveyance Act or failed to apply it ahd 
has stated that if an action for divorce or separate 
maintenance is filed that any conveyance made may 
be held to be invalid, and it is immaterial that: (1) 
there was a valuable and fair consideration for the 
transfer, (2) there was no fraudulent intent by the 
grantor, ('3) there Was no knowledge by the grantee 
of any fraudulent intent of his grantor, or ( 4) that 
the wife may or may not be a '·'creditor" or "other 
person" under the statute. 
14 
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CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted th'at on the law 
and the facts, the decision of the trial court should 
be reversed with judgment in favor of Plaintiff-
Appellant for partition of real property, and for an 
accounting of rental income. Since Defendant-Res-
pondent stated that she was satisfied with the evi-
dence on her counter-claim (T.R. p. 35) no useful 
purpose would be served by a retrial and the judg-
ment should be reversed forthwith. 
Respectfully submitted, 
JOHN D. GLYNN 
In Propria Persona 
9171 Wilshire Boulevard 
Beverly Hills, California 
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